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WILLIAM B. GOULD IV*
Focusing on a wide range of substantive arenas, Professor Gould
analyzes many of the major labor law decisions of the Burger
Court. He begins by comparing the Court's methodology with that
of the Warren Court and asserts that the Burger Court has in
many instances simply expanded on themes developed by its pred-
ecessor. He also discusses areas in which the Burger Court has
broken new ground. Finally, Professor Gould concludes that the
Burger Court has accelerated the pendulum in a direction in which
it was already swinging - against the interests of organized
labor.
INTRODUCTION
The Warren Court's life span was sixteen years - from 1953,
when President Eisenhower appointed Governor Warren to the
Court as Chief Justice, until 1969, when President Nixon accepted
his resignation. In a sense, however, it might be said that the War-
ren Court has its genesis in its landmark civil liberties decisions of
1957 when the Court's working majority issued a series of rulings
possessing a pronounced liberal flavor. Similarly, some of the most
significant Burger Court employment opinions were rendered just
within the past decade. Thus the philosophical stance of each Court
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developed after a period of time.
In any event, the Burger Court served a period of time which was
slightly more than that of the Warren Court - seventeen years,
from 1969 through 1986. Its legacy in arenas of the latter's innova-
tions such as racial segregation, reapportionment and criminal proce-
dure, is not a ground-breaking one. If for no other reason, however,
than the sheer volume of litigation involving labor and employment
statutes before the Court it is doubtful that the same can be said
about the Burger Court's decisions in labor law. The Nation's first
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 presented the Court with a fresh slate upon
which to write. In addition, frequent and litigation-generating rever-
sals of precedent by the Reagan National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB)2 brought many issues before the Burger Court, which
seems destined to leave a mark in the labor law area at least as
durable as that of its predecessor.
The Court's handling of its labor law docket during these past sev-
enteen years has provided a series of statutory interpretations which
have produced a tilt towards management over labor on the issues of
greatest import. But the Court cannot be said to be anti-labor or, to
be more precise, profoundly less sympathetic to organized labor than
was the Warren Court. True, in cases involving the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) - admittedly a declining percentage of
what is now placed under the rubric of labor and employment law -
the Warren Court decided more cases in favor of unions than did the
Burger Court.3
Perhaps even more revealing is the fact that the Burger Court's
pro-union stance involved an affirmance of NLRB decisions and or-
ders and consequent deference to Board expertise in a substantially
greater number of cases than was true of the Warren Court. Accord-
ingly, the Warren Court was willing to stake out a pro-union position
on its own initiative more frequently than the Burger Court.
Statistics, however, are sometimes superficial, especially if one
takes into account some of the doctrinal legacies of the Warren
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000aa-12 (1982).
2. Compare Walther, The NLRB Today, 36 LAB. L.J. 803 (1985) with Mo-
djeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase I, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1985). See generally Gould,
Fifty Years Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Retrospective View, 37 LAB. L.J.
235 (1986); Gould, Mistaken Opposition to the NLRB, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at
A27, col. 2; Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of
NLRB Lawmaking, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7 (1985).
3. A survey of NLRB cases decided by the Burger Court shows that out of the
53 opinions which favored either labor or management, unions prevailed in 31 (58.4%).
For the Warren Court, of 55 decisions favoring one side or other, unions prevailed in 44
(80%). For the period between the passage of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) until September of 1953, of 79 decisions favoring either labor or management,"pro-labor" positions prevailed in 60 opinions (77%).
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Court. In truth, the Burger Court has pushed the pendulum that was
already swinging in its direction - the beat goes on - although, as
we shall see, marcato - with emphasis.
The point is made in a more telling fashion if one recalls a number
of the Warren Court's landmark decisions. Three of its labor law
decisions presented themes developed more fully by the Burger
Court. The first is NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox," in which the War-
ren Court, despite the Stone Court's holding that union solicitation
and distribution of literature on company property was protected ac-
tivity,5 held that nonemployee union organizers could not distribute
literature on company working lots unless there were no alternative
avenues of communication available.6 The Court itself later charac-
terized this rule as a presumption against union access to company
property. 7 In fact, the self-organizational rights of employees were at
stake in both cases - arguably even more at stake when the poten-
tial sophistication and expertise of nonemployee union organizers
were involved. Nevertheless, Babcock & Wilcox gave these employee
rights short shrift in deference to employer property rights.
In a second holding, Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co.,8 almost a decade later, the Court again exalted employer prop-
erty interests and management prerogatives over employee statutory
rights. This time, it held that an employer could close its plant, and
thus deprive workers of jobs, for anti-union reasons - even though
the statute forbids such conduct in all other contexts when the rea-
son for the managerial decision is rooted in anti-union considera-
tions. Both Babcock & Wilcox and Darlington laid the foundation
4. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
5. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). See generally
Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REv. 73
(1964); Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of "Quasi-Public" Prop-
erty, 49 MINN. L. REv. 505 (1965). Ironically, the Burger Court articulated the rationale
for Republic Aviation, albeit in a different context: "The place of work is a place
uniquely appropriate for the dissemination of views concerning the bargaining represen-
tative and the various options open to the employees." NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S.
322, 325 (1975).
6. It is our judgment ... that an employer may validly post his property
against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the
union through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach
the employees with its message and if the employer's notice or order does not
discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112.
7. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978).
8. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
for one of the Burger Court's most important holdings.9
Another telling decision is International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. Vogt0 ° where Justice Frankfurter, simultaneous with the
Warren Court's first landmark civil liberty decisions,1 characterized
an earlier Supreme Court ruling equating picketing with constitu-
tionally protected free speech as excessively "sweeping."' 2 One is not
required to accept Justice Douglas' dissent in Vogt, in which he
states that the Court was signing a "formal surrender" for picketing
as free speech, to observe that the Burger Court seems to have lost
all sight of free speech, at least in the secondary picketing context.13
Again, however, it seems to me that the seeds were sown by the
Warren Court and only cultivated more assiduously by its successor.
In a sense the Court's labor posture during this past half century
of modern labor law mirrors societal developments in industrial rela-
tions outside the law, that is, a decline of unions in the United
States. The Court's decisions have frequently left the labor move-
ment without effective recourse to self-organizational and collective
bargaining rights as the movement has sought to protect those whom
it represents in an era of retreat. The added dimension seems to be
that the Burger Court has denied the support of the law to our au-
tonomous system of collective bargaining, and made its preservation
a more formidable task. Again, however, the origins of the mischief
may be found in an important Warren Court decision addressing
which bargaining items are important enough to compel labor and
management to bargain about. That decision, NLRB v. Wooster Di-
vision of Borg-Warner,' ultimately permitted the Burger Court to
give full reign to the very free enterprise policy considerations which
were integral to the trilogy of decisions, Babcock, Darlington and
Vogt.
All attempts, however, to promote union and collective bargaining
autonomy have not been failures. It is not without significance that
most of the key union victories at the Burger Court were obtained in
conflicts with their own members and those whom they represent.
Three examples demonstrate this point well.
The first is International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
9. That decision was NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342
(1958). See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
10. 354 U.S. 945 (1957).
11. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
12. Justice Frankfurter's reference is to Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940).
13. E.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607
(1980).
14. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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States, 5 in which the Court held, 7-2, that a collective bargaining
agreement's denial of retroactive seniority credits to black and Mexi-
can-American workers, historically locked into lower paying and less
desirable jobs as they advance into all white departments, was not a
violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - which pro-
hibits discrimination in employment on account of race, color, sex,
religion and national origin. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
relied upon the legislative history surrounding the statute's "bonafide
seniority" proviso which states that a nondiscriminatory seniority
system is not an unlawful employment practice under the Act. The
critical flaw in the Court's analysis, in my opinion, is that Congress
expressed no view about departmental or job seniority - the concern
was that employees in all white plants or craft union members not be
deprived of seniority by heretofore unemployed blacks.
Nevertheless, the Court purported to find legislative intent to deny
incumbent black workers of retroactive seniority and to devise enor-
mously time consuming and burdensome proceedings, subsequent to
the trial, in which minorities and female workers must establish enti-
tlement to retroactive seniority in the context of across the board
discrimination which has already been proven at trial. The Court's
opinions in both Teamsters and Firefighters v. Stotts16 cast an omi-
nous shadow over the propriety of judicially imposed hiring and pro-
motion quotas for some time - another source of conflict between
blacks and unions.
At the same time, virtually all members of the Burger Court ap-
pear to have demonstrated some measure of solicitude for quotas and
goals which have been voluntarily devised 17 - though a majority of
the Court sounded a note somewhat similar to that heard in Team-
sters in condemning voluntary affirmative action when seniority
rights are altered and layoffs are a consequence."8 Moreover, the
Court, by holding that consent decrees as well as private agreements
15. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). My views on this matter are set forth in more detail in
W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 67-92 (1977); Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles
and Its Implications, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1969); Gould, Employment Security, Se-
niority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1
(1967).
16. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
17. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 444 U.S. 889 (1979); Gould, The Supreme
Court and Labor Law: The October 1978 Term, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 649-57 (1979).
18. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). But see United
States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (promotions context).
may provide for race conscious affirmative action19 and that goals
may be imposed to remedy "egregious discrimination" by unions and
employers20 has both promoted the interests of minority employees
and rebuffed the Reagan Administration.
On the other hand, a second example of Burger Court approval of
union hegemony over the interests of members in the context of a
union-minority group controversy is Emporium-Capwell v. Western
Addition Community Organization.21 In that case the Court held, 8-
1, that employees who engage in unauthorized self-help picketing in
protest of discriminatory employment conditions, undermine the
union's role as exclusive bargaining representative and thereby en-
gage in unprotected activity which exposes them to discharge or dis-
cipline. Because of the Court's exaggerated fear of the bargaining
unit's balkanization, the holding fails to take into account the pos-
ture of dissidents confronted with an unresponsive union. Moreover,
the goal of racially and sexually integrated union leaderships - the
absence of which has inspired distrust and the kind of self-help in-
volved in Emporium-Capwell - has hardly been realized.
Third, the Court held 5-4 in the Sadlowski22 decision that the
Steelworkers' prohibition against outside financial assistance for
union office candidates was a "reasonable qualification" upon the
free speech rights of union members under the Landrum-Griffin
Act's Bill of Rights. The Court refused to equate first amendment
free speech rights with those protected by Landrum-Griffin. 23
Sadlowski, like Teamsters and Emporium-Capwell, is a victory
for entrenched and sometimes unresponsive union bureaucracies over
dissidents and minority workers - not a triumph for labor move-
ment representation of workers. Here the unions have done well with
the Burger Court when confronting the bosses themselves.
In some instances, as in a series of cases involving job security for
employees represented by unions,24 consumer secondary picketing,2 5
and union authority to impose sanctions upon strikebreakers,2 the
Burger Court has undercut precedent adumbrated by the Warren
Court. But in other areas, such as the recently discovered statutory
19. See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
20. See Local No. 28, of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct.
3019 (1986).
21. 420 U.S. 50 (1975). See Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact
Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969); Gould, The Status
of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967).
22. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
23. Id. at 111.
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); NLRB v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
25. NLRB v. Retail Store Employee Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
26. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
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exclusion for managerial employees under the NLRA,21 and the de-
nial of remedial authority which includes the imposition of contract
terms,28 the Court has written on a relatively fresh slate. On the
other hand, in the antitrust-labor 29 and duty of fair representation"
0
arenas, the Court's handiwork can be seen as a logical extension of
doctrine already wrought by the Warren Court.
Of course, one factor serves to impose limits upon any comments
that may be made about the Burger Court. This is that a substantial
number of the cases were decided by a 5-4 vote.3' This phenomenon
reflects the obvious but frequently unpalatable truth that federal la-
bor law, framed as it is in broad ambiguous language addressing
matters about which Congress has been unable to provide definitive
policy judgments, is federal labor policy defined by the NLRB and
ultimately the Supreme Court. The Court is deeply divided on many
aspects of this ongoing policy debate.
Some of the issues - like the Burger Court's 5-4 decision holding
that an employer may not be ordered to bargain with the union as
exclusive representative on the basis of majority support evidenced
by authorization cards and picket line without independent unfair
labor practice violations 2 - have seen alignments on the Court
which cut across ideological predisposition, if one can judge this fac-
tor on the basis of presidential appointments.3 This is again true of
27. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (faculty members are endowed
with "managerial status", which is sufficient to exempt them from the Act's coverage as
"professional employees" under section 2(12) of the NLRA); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). But see NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership
Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
28. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
29. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975). Cf. H.A. Artists & Assoc., Inc. v. Actor's Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S.
704 (1981).
30. Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Faust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S.
554 (1976).
31. A survey of labor law decisions of the Burger Court shows that out of 129
decisions, 22 were decided by a 5-4 vote. These 129 cases include 90 "labor management
relations cases", 18 preemption cases, and 21 individual rights cases.
32. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974) (Justice
Brennan, Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Douglas' majority
opinion).
33. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (Justice
Rehnquist joined in Justice Marshall's majority opinion and Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Brennan were aligned in the dissent); Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S.
302 (1971) (another 5-4 decision in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan
joined in majority and Justice Marshall dissented); Local 3489, United Steelworkers v.
Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977); (Chief Justice Burger aligned in the majority while Justice
cases in which the Burger Court reversed the Warren Court when,
for instance, it declared that employer injunctions could be obtained
against unions for contractual violations3 4 - properly in my view -
and refused to extend the holding to sympathy3" and political
strikes. 6
But the ideological polarization is evidenced by the frequently con-
trasting positions taken by Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist -
as well as by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice
Burger.3 7 Nothing more vividly marks the shift than the Court's re-
cent 5-3 holding that workers may resign from unions to avoid disci-
pline because of their statutorily protected right to refrain from
union activity.38 Twenty years ago the Warren Court held 5-4 that
unions had a vital interest in imposing fines under the same circum-
stances to implement the strike's integrity 9 - despite the fact that
the sanctions were imposed upon strikebreakers who were exercising
the very same right to refrain which the Burger Court found so im-
portant in June 1985.40
But at this point, the profound switch associated with the depar-
ture of the "nine old men" in the late 1930's has not developed in
the labor law decisions of the 1980's; it is, for the most part, a
change in emphasis. Moreover, since the Justices say that they be-
lieve in deference to the Board, at least when they want to,41 it is
possible that if new Presidents appoint new NLRB members just as
Rehnquist joined the dissent). NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979) (in this 5-4 decision, Chief Justice Burger authored the anti-union majority al-
igned with Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan).
34. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
35. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976)
(Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined the majority while Justice Brennan
and Justice Marshall dissented); see also Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitra-
tior Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REV. 533 (1978). Contra Atleson, The Circle
of Boys Market: A Comment on Judicial Inventiveness, 7 INDUS. REL L.J. 88 (1985).
36. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, 457 U.S.
702 (1982).
37. See generally Gould, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Docket
in the October 1980 Term: Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1981); cf.
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
38. Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
39. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
40. For further discussion of Pattern Makers' and Allis-Chalmers, see infra notes
81-86 and accompanying text.
41. As Justice Powell noted in Pattern Makers' "Because of the Board's 'special
competence' in the field of labor relations, its interpretation of the Act is accorded sub-
stantial deference." Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3068. This difference has been recog-
nized on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979);
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975). But see American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). Justice Stewart stated "we think that the Board
construes its functions too expansively when it claims general authority to define national
labor policy by balancing the competing interests of labor and management." Id. at 316.
For a discussion of some of the Warren Court's decisions, see Modjeska, Labor and
the Warren Court, 8 INDUS. REL L.J. 479 (1986).
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desirous of the repudiation of precedent as their predecessors
4 2 that
the Court, without regard to any change in ideological composition,
will defer to more recently acquired administrative expertise. Con-
versely, new appointments to the Court by President Reagan before
1989 could produce the sharp swing to the right that has not yet
fully developed. In the interim, we have marcato.
Meanwhile, paradoxes abound throughout the wide scope and va-
riety of issues which confronted the Court. As noted, there were nu-
merous 5-4 votes, but there are a number of examples of high tribu-
nal unanimity - and in a number of these cases the balance has
been weighted in favor of unions and employees.
A fairly recent example is NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment43 in which the Court unanimously held that when the Board
proves that anti-union animus is a substantial and motivating factor
in the employer's treatment of a worker, it makes out a prima facie
case of statutory violation and the burden is then upon the employer
to show that the employee would have been dismissed or disciplined
in the same way regardless of the anti-union motivation.
What is particularly remarkable in this opinion is Justice White's
dicta on behalf of the Court that the Board's previous approach to
"mixed motive" cases, under which a statutory violation was found
where simply one of a number of reasons for the discharge was im-
permissible (that is, anti-union motivation), was an approach which
was compatible with the Act." The Board's lack of success with the
circuit courts of appeals both before and after its own change in po-
sition,45 had led to its adoption of the more convoluted standard
which was approved by the Court in Transportation Management.
The Court also rejected the argument that the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments' proviso precluding relief for employees dismissed with
"cause" had any applicability to the appropriate allocation of burden
42. The political character of the Board has been noted by commentators. See,
e.g., Bierman, Judge Posner and the NLRB: Implications for Labor Law Reform, 69
MINN. L. REv. 881 (1985); Bierman, Reflections on the Problem of Labor Board Insta-
bility, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 551 (1985); Gregory, The National Labor Relations Board
and the Politics of Labor Law, 27 B.C.L. REv. 39 (1985); Gross, supra note 2; Summers,
Politics, Policy Making and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93 (1954); Note, The
NLRB under Republican Administration, Recent Trends and their Political Implica-
tions, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 852 (1955).
43. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
44. Justice White noted: "As we understand the Board's decisions, they have con-
sistently held that the unfair labor practice consists of a discharge or adverse action that
is based in whole or in part on anti-union animus." Id. at 401.
45. Id. at 399-401.
of prooL 46
An unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Powell, in Metro-
politan Edison v. NLRB4 7 held that an employer could not impose
heavier sanctions or discipline upon union officials who, along with
other employees, violated a "no strike" clause on the grounds that
since they were union officials they possess more responsibility for
such misconduct. Again, the Court, to the surprise of management
labor lawyers, summarily rejected the contention that the union had
waived the right of such officials to strike without additional sanc-
tions where the contract had been renegotiated subsequent to arbi-
tral decisions favoring such employer sanctions. The Court, noting
the inapplicability of stare decisis principles to arbitration,48 con-
cluded that discipline different from that imposed upon other em-
ployees was lawful only when the union had explicitly waived the
right of union officials to be treated in a uniform, nondiscriminatory
fashion for no strike clause violations.
Viewed in context, both Transportation Management and Metro-
politan Edison (which might have attracted dissenters offended by
the short shrift provided by the Court to the arbitration process) are
more surprising for their unanimity than for what is in the holdings
and in the language of the opinions. In my view, the same is true of
a third case in which the Court, speaking through Justice Brennan,
unanimously reversed the Board and held that an employer was
obliged to bargain with a union which had affiliated with a new labor
organization through a union member-only vote.49 And in yet a
fourth instance of unanimity, Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks,5" the Court held that a union which had negotiated a secur-
ity agreement under the Railway Labor Act could not use such dues
payments obtained from objecting nonmembers for purposes such as
organizing drives and general litigation.
The issue in Ellis stems largely from an earlier Burger Court deci-
sion, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,5 1 which held that there
was no constitutional barrier to an agency shop agreement between a
public employer and teachers' union but that dissenting nonmembers
46. As Justice White emphatically stated: "We are quite sure ... that the Courtof Appeals erred in holding that § 10(c) forbids placing the burden on the employer toprove that absent the improper motivation he would have acted in the same manner for
wholly legitimate reasons." Id. at 401.
47. 460 U.S. 693 (1983); cf. Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrowing
Path to Rectitude?, 50 INDUs. L.J. 472 (1975).
48. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 708-09.49. NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, Local 1182, 106 S. Ct. 1007 (1986).50. 466 U.S. 435 (1984); see also Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. I v. Hud-
son, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
51. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). For a discussion of the peculiarities of the employee-employer relationship in the public sector, see Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A
Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974).
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could not be compelled to pay monies used for ideological causes
which are not "germane" to collective bargaining. Ellis was an at-
tempt to give meaning to the language employed in Abood.
The thesis advanced by Justice White for the Court in Ellis -
and from which not one single Justice dissented - is that dues pay-
ments spent for organizing drives are not "germane" to the union's
collective bargaining responsibilities in the unit and are therefore not
within the scope of activities for which Congress intended unions to
be relieved of "free rider" problems. The proposition that expendi-
tures for organizational activity are not germane to collective bar-
gaining and therefore cannot be imposed upon those who would oth-
erwise be free riders, an idea which received no explication
whatsoever by Justice White in Ellis, totally ignores what all observ-
ers of labor-management relations have known since the beginning
of organized relationships between the two: Unions must organize
and recruit new members to protect the gains and standards of those
in the bargaining unit. This is especially so when the organizational
activities are taking place amongst employers which are direct com-
petitors of the enterprise in which the dues are collected - although
the truth of this proposition seems to me to be self-evident in other
situations as well.
The unanimity in Ellis constitutes the biggest surprise of all! It is
beyond belief that not one single Justice would dissent from this
otherworldly opinion. But the holding, while arising within the con-
text of a union-dissident individual employee dispute, is symptomatic
of the general tilt against the labor movement to which I have
alluded.
JOB SECURITY
The Duty to Bargain Under the National Labor Relations Act
With the advent of concession bargaining in the late 70's and 80's
and increased union setbacks, the focus of the labor movement has
become job security. Ironically, in a major shift from guidelines -
though admittedly tentative - of the Warren Court, the Burger
Court left the job security interests of workers more imperiled than
they were in the past.
The Warren Court held that an employer's contracting out of
work involved terms and conditions of employment within the mean-
ing of the Act5 2 and therefore constituted a mandatory subject of
52. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); see Summers,
bargaining under federal labor law. Inasmuch as the managerial de-
cision in question would have left the workers with no jobs at all, it
is difficult to discern the line of reasoning which assumes that such
decisions are not a mandatory subject of bargaining. But the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Warren, in an opinion which seemed
to be responsive to an influential concurring opinion by Justice Stew-
art, 53 attempted to strike a balance between management preroga-
tives on one side, and that which constituted terms and conditions of
employment, on the other, even though the former are not referred
to in the Act. The Court relied in part" upon the existence of negoti-
ated contract provisions addressing the issue of contracting out as a
basis for concluding that the issue was a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining. Meanwhile, however, the Warren Court's Darlington opin-
ion on plant closures signified much less solicitude for employee in-
terests than that expressed in the contracting out context.
In any event, the Burger Court's first encounter with the
mandatory subject issue hinted at a different approach altogether. In
Allied Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,55 the Court
held that the benefits of previously retired employees are not a
mandatory item given that retired employees are not "employees"
within the meaning of the Act. This rather strained reading of the
statute failed to observe that unions and employers have traditionally
dealt with such issues at the bargaining table. But the full retreat
was still a decade away, and when it came, it induced Justice Bren-
nan, the author of Pittsburgh Plate Glass, to switch to the dissenting
side..
In 1981 by 7-2 vote, the Burger Court, in First National Mainte-
nance, Corp. v. NLRB50 concluded that a partial closure of a busi-
ness was a management prerogative which unions could not compel
employers to bargain over - even though the workers' jobs and con-
ditions of employment were eliminated more completely than they
would be in most contracting out cases. The rationale employed by
Justice Blackmun for the majority rests upon a number of considera-
tions.5 But an overriding theme was that Congress, when it passed
Labor Law on the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59 (1965).
53. In his concurring opinion Justice Stewart wrote: "While employment security
has thus properly been recognized in various circumstances as a condition of employ-
ment, it surely does not follow that every decision which may affect job security is a
subject of compulsory collective bargaining." Fibreboard Paper, 379 U.S. at 233.
54. Id. at 211.
55. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
56. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
57. For a discussion of First National Maintenance, see Gould, supra note 37, at
6-18. The Congress could enact legislation requiring or encouraging consultation with
unions and workers prior to plant closures. Four states have some form of plant closure
legislation: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. There are constitutional
problems with state legislation in this arena. See Comment, NLRA Preemption of State
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the Wagner Act in 1935, did not intend to have labor and manage-
ment act as partners with one another, Senator Wagner's promotion
of industrial democracy notwithstanding." Said the Court: "in es-
tablishing what issues must be submitted to the process of bargain-
ing, Congress had no expectation that the elected union representa-
tive would become an equal partner in the running of the business
enterprise in which the union's members are employed."
59
Moreover, when it was contended that labor and management had
indeed addressed the plant closure issue in collective agreements -
the very point relied upon by the Warren Court to find that both
sides were legally obliged to bargain about the decision in the con-
tracting out case - an opposite inference was drawn. This time
around the Court reasoned that such experiences demonstrated that
invocation of the law was not necessary to bring about collective bar-
gaining when plant closures were involved and the parties wanted to
bargain. Since the parties were bargaining in spite of the law, legal
intervention was unnecessary. The fact that other parties had been
able to deal with threatened closures through negotiations signified
not only their importance (for example, a dismissed worker will have
no conditions of employment at all) but also that the matter is ame-
nable to resolution through collective bargaining, a consideration
which the Court stressed as an important one in First National
Maintenance. Meanwhile, the Burger Court, which could not view a
decision eliminating workers' jobs as a mandatory subject of bar-
and Local Plant Relocation Laws, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 407 (1986). Federal plant closing
laws have been proposed periodically over the last few years. The latest bill (H.R. 1616)
was defeated on November 21, 1985 by a 208-203 vote. H.R. 1616 would have required
a 90-day notice for a layoff or plant shutdown affecting 100 or more employees, or 50-
100 employees where the laid-off employees constituted at least 30% of the workforce.
This year Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum have introduced similar legislation in the
form of Senate Bill 538. Even a Task Force created by the Reagan Administration has
advocated notification prior to plant closings. See Economic Adjustment and Worker
Dislocation in a Competitive Society, Report of the Secretary of Labor's Task Force on
Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation (Dec. 1986). For a discussion of foreign
experience, see W. GOuLD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 94-116
(1984). Developments in both Europe and Japan make it clear that access to information
on a continuous basis is more important than notification, consultation or bargaining at
the time of plant closure. Gould, Union Involvement in Employer Decision-making:
Some Reflections on America and Europe, 58 TUL. L. REv. 1322 (1984). American law
as developed by both the Warren and Burger Courts, is not particularly helpful. See
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S.
301 (1979).
58. For the view that Senator Wagner originally intended that Act to create
broad "freedoms" and industrial democracy, see Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin
and Current Significance, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 199 (1960).
59. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 676.
gaining, concluded that mandatory bargaining nevertheless en-
veloped management's decisions relating to food prices in vending
machines!
60
First National Maintenance therefore stands some of the Warren
Court's precedent on its head.6" My view is that the Warren Court's
decision provided broad scope for NLRB and Supreme Court value
judgments62 relating to what constitutes mandatory and nonmanda-
tory subjects of bargaining and the consequent mischief contained in
First National Maintenance. The broadest possible scope ought to be
given to both parties to bring issues to the bargaining table. The
Burger Court took the opportunity provided by Warren Court prece-
dent to override this policy in the name of management prerogatives.
The Successorship Cases
The Warren Court had gone far towards circumventing traditional
privity of contract notions in the labor law arena by holding that a
union could compel arbitration with a successor employer which had
not entered into a collective bargaining agreement itself but rather
could be said to have inherited it from another. Some of the Court's
reasoning in the case which established the precedent, John Wiley &
Sons v. Livingstons can be seen in Justice Harlan's opinion for the
Court which had been concerned about job security and said the
following:
Employees, and the union which represents them, ordinarily do not take
part in negotiations leading to a change in corporate ownership. The negoti-
ations will ordinarily not concern the well-being of the employees, whose
advantage or disadvantage, potentially great, will inevitably be incidental to
the main considerations. The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in
established principles of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of
owners independently to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate
themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the employees
from a sudden change in the employment relationship. The transition from
one corporate organization to another will in most cases be eased and indus-
trial strife avoided if employees' claims continue to be resolved by arbitra-
tion rather than by 'the relative strength ... of the contending forces.''
A remarkably different theme on the successorship issue was soon
to be sounded by the Burger Court. In NLRB v. Burns International
Security Services, 5 the Court held that a refusal to adhere to the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the pred-
60. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
61. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964);
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
62. See J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1983).
63. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
64. Id. at 549 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960)).
65. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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ecessor was not an unlawful refusal to bargain by the successor em-
ployer. The Court in Burns viewed the Wiley accommodation be-
tween freedom of contract and labor law principles to be a "limited"
one inapplicable to a successor employer which was "ordinarily free
to set initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a predeces-
sor""8 and to determine which employees would be hired - so long
as there was not refusal to hire for anti-union reasons. On this point
the Court was unanimous, although Justice Rehnquist on behalf of
the Chief Justice, Justices Brennan and Powell sharply dissented
from the conclusion that the successor could be obligated to bargain
and opined that the imposition of the duty to bargain
would import unwarranted rigidity into labor-management relations ...
[said the Court] ...an employer who has currently gained production or-
ders at the expense of another may well wish to hire employees away from
that other. There is no reason to think that the best interests of the employ-
ees, the employers, and ultimately of the free market are not served by such
movement. 
7
Finally, two years after Burns, the Court in Howard Johnson, 8
over Justice Douglas' lone dissent, held that the principles of John
Wiley & Sons were not applicable where the successor did not hire a
majority of the predecessor's work force. The Court's rule providing
both freedom to hire new employees in most instances, and a greater
likelihood that new companies would have statutory and contractual
obligations imposed upon them where the majority of the old work
force is hired, has created an incentive and opportunity for employ-
ers to avoid unions and collective bargaining agreements.
Here, as in First National Maintenance the Court's view of labor
law did not produce substantial division within its own ranks. No
member of the Burger Court would have revived the language, and
seemingly the holding, of John Wiley & Sons. No clear break be-
tween the Burger Court and Warren Court - at least between their
members - is immediately evident.
66. Id. at 294.
67. Id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel & Res-
taurant Employees Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); cf. Local No. 434 v. Sky Vue
Terrace, Inc., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2097 (3d Cir. 1985); Local Lodge No. 1266 v.
Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981); Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem.
Workers Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
Bankruptcy Cases
The accommodation between labor and bankruptcy law has pro-
voked yet another 5-4 decision - again on the side of the employer
interests and against the job security concerns of the employees - in
the Bildisco69 case. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion concluded
that the NLRA's prohibition against repudiation of collective bar-
gaining agreements could be ignored by virtue of the policies con-
tained in the Bankruptcy Act. The Court held that the filing of a
bankruptcy petition could preclude enforcement of the collective bar-
gaining agreement when the equities were balanced in favor of re-
jecting the labor contract. But as Justice Brennan said in dissent:
"[T]he Court points to no provision of that [Bankruptcy] Code that
purports to render § 8(d) [prohibiting the termination and modifica-
tion of collective bargaining agreements] inapplicable, and to no pro-
vision of the NLRA that would preclude the application of §
8(d). °7 0 The Court thus provided no true accommodation between
labor and bankruptcy law. Congress has partially reversed the Court
on this matter71 thus providing some measure of support for the view
that the Court's Bildisco holding did not accurately reflect congres-
sional intent as contained in the two statutes.
EMPLOYEES PROTECTED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
In three major decisions, the Burger Court resolved questions
about protection and coverage under federal labor law against the
interests of unions and employees. Although the Act excludes from
the definition of employees such individuals as supervisors1 2 inde-
pendent contractors, domestic servants, and spouses of employers7 8
the Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,7 4 held that managerial
employees who make corporate policy are not employees within the
meaning of the Act and thus are excluded from its coverage - even
though the statute does not refer to them in the list of exclusions.
But the Court's 1980 opinion, NLRB v. Yeshiva University,75 was
even more remarkable in its definition of what constituted a manage-
rial employee. Here, the Court concluded that university professors
who had some degree of autonomy in defining their jobs and who
operated under a system of self-governance - under which it was
assumed that recommendations were frequently implemented as pol-
icy - were not employees within the meaning of the Act. The as-
69. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
70. Id. at 539 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1982).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
73. Id.
74. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
75. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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sumption of the Court, again in a 5-4 vote, was that an adversarial
model of employee-employer relations70 is a prerequisite for collec-
tive bargaining under federal labor law.
One of the most remarkable elements of the Court's reasoning in
Yeshiva was that a model of cooperation in which job autonomy and
responsibility is promoted in the interest of mature industrial rela-
tions relationships meant that the statute did not apply. The logic of
Yeshiva cuts not only against the grain of common sense and modern
industrial relations development, but also would argue against statu-
tory coverage for janitors, for instance, if they were given substantial
responsibility in defining their job and a framework for employee
views which provided that they would be seriously considered. Again,
the decision's origins seem to lie in the adversarial ideology ironically
promoted by Justice Brennan in a very different context. Along
with First National Maintenance, the Burger Court's decision in
Yeshiva seems to have unsettled new efforts to inspire employee loy-
alty within the framework of collective bargaining and thus obtain
cooperation and mature relationships.
A third decision, Sure-Tan Incorporated v. NLRB,78 again a 5-4
split, has engendered even more confusion. Once again, the Court
seems to have come down on the same policy side as in Bell Aero-
space and Yeshiva. In Sure-Tan the Court was confronted with a
question of whether illegal aliens are employees within the meaning
of the Act. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority concluded
that for a number of reasons the question must be answered affirma-
tively.79 But the Court's holding made it unlikely that the employees
would receive the remedies under the Act, that is, reinstatement and
back pay. The Court specifically rejected the view that a presump-
tion of back pay for a six month period was appropriate, concluding
that this rule was erroneous inasmuch as employees must be ready
and able to work during the time for which they receive back pay.
Inasmuch as the employees may not be within the country subse-
quent to their unlawful dismissal by the employer because the em-
76. "The act was intended to accommodate the type of management employee
relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry." Id. at 680.
77. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). Here the
Court justified its hostility to the regulation of economic weaponry on the ground that
such an approach would be inconsistent with an adversarial model of industrial relations.
See Gould, supra note 2.
78. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
79. Id. at 892.
ployer has arranged for their deportation,8" it is difficult for the em-
ployees to obtain the remedies provided under the Act.
UNION DISCIPLINE AND INTEGRITY OF THE STRIKE
In a 5-4 decision rendered in 196781 a Warren Court majority had
held that the imposition of court-enforceable union fines against "full
union members" did not restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of their rights to refrain from union activities under the Act. But in
1972, Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court over Justice Black-
mun's "lone solitary dissent", held that it was an unfair labor prac-
tice for unions to impose fines upon workers who had resigned their
membership.82 Thus, the major issue that developed before the Bur-
ger Court was whether the Act's promotion of collective bargaining
and the right of workers to both engage in and refrain from union
activities contemplated some kind of accommodation between union
and individual employee interests which would allow fines to be im-
posed upon those workers whose right to resign was limited through
union constitutional restrictions. The Burger Court answered this
question in the negative and upheld the Board's ruling that fines im-
posed upon workers who resign in the teeth of union rules constituted
unlawful restraint and coercion.
In Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB,83 the Court held that the
Board's rule was a "reasonable" one and that union fines imposed
upon those who had resigned curtailed the right to refrain from
union activity. Said Justice Powell, speaking for a 5-3 majority: "We
believe that the inconsistency between union restrictions on the right
to resign and the policy of voluntary unionism supports [the view
that union restrictions upon the right to resign are] . . . invalid. 84
The Court reached its conclusion on what Justice Blackmun, in dis-
sent characterized as "[a]n unspoken concept of voluntary unionism
that, carried to its extreme, would deny to the union member - in
the name of having his participation in the union be voluntary - the
right to make any meaningful promise to his co-workers." 85
I am of the view that the Warren Court's precedent was correct in
its protection of the right to strike as a part of federal labor policy
and that it provided the Court with an opportunity in 1985 to in-
struct the Board to accommodate the competing institutional inter-
ests (all of them statutorily protected) of union members vis-a-vis
80. Id. at 903.
81. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
82. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union, Local 1029, 409
U.S. 213 (1972).
83. 105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
84. Id. at 3070.
85. Id. at 3082 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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dissidents.8 6 The Court missed the opportunity. So also did the dis-
sent which suggested no guidelines relating to an accommodation be-
tween the right to engage in and refrain from union activities and
which - as Justice Powell's majority opinion properly noted - was
therefore equally deficient in shaping a balance.
SECONDARY PICKETING
In NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Lo-
cal 760 (Tree Fruits),87 the Warren Court had held that secondary
consumer picketing was not violative of the secondary boycott
prohibitions contained in the NLRA where the primary employer
was only one of a number of suppliers to a retail supermarket. The
theory of the Court, undoubtedly unrealistic, was that such a second-
ary employer was not coerced - whereas if the secondary was to-
tally or primarily dependent upon a primary it might well be. A ba-
sis for the Court's statutory construction seemed to be that a more
expansive prohibition would place the first amendment's free speech
provisions, which are applicable to picketing, on a collision course
with the restrictions of Landrum-Griffin. The opinion authored by
Justice Brennan seemed also to rest upon a distinction between so
called "publicity" and "signal" picketing. 88
In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union (Safeco),89 Justice
Powell, speaking for the Court, concluded that secondary consumer
picketing aimed at a secondary who is dependent upon the primary
would leave "responsive consumers no realistic option other than to
boycott the title companies [secondary employer] altogether."90 The
Court concluded that whereas the secondary picketing in Tree Fruits
provided only "incidental injury to the neutral" employer by virtue
of the "natural consequence of an effective primary boycott," con-
sumer product picketing in these circumstances could "be expected
to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss" and there-
fore were violative of the secondary boycott prohibitions in the
86. See Gould, Solidarity Forever - Or Hardly Ever: Union Discipline, Taft-
Hartley, and the Right of Union Members to Resign, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 74 (1980).
87. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
88. We have examined the legislative history of the amendments to §
8(b)(4), and conclude that it does not reflect with the requisite clarity a congres-
sional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, and,
particularly, any concern with peaceful picketing when it is limited ... to per-
suading Safeway customers not to buy Washington State apples ....
Id. at 63.
89. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
90. Id. at 613.
statute.91
The Court rejected contentions that the Constitution may not pro-
hibit such a broad ban against peaceful picketing when, said Justice
Powell, picketing "spreads labor discord by coercing a neutral party
to join the fray."'9 2 Little discussion followed except citation to sec-
ondary picketing cases in which employees were induced to cease
work and to engage in stoppages. Justice Stevens, however, in a sep-
arate concurring opinion, concluded that the constitutional issue was
"not quite as easy as the plurality would make it seem . . . ," but
concluded that the Constitution was not offended where restrictions
were imposed upon picketing in "furtherance of objectives deemed
unlawful by Congress."93 Said Justice Stevens, "[t]he statutory ban
in this case affects only that aspect of the union's efforts to commu-
nicate its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal,
rather than a reasoned response to an idea."94
The picketing in Safeco, however, was publicity picketing which in
the past, particularly in Tree Fruits, had been distinguished from
signal picketing. Justice Steven's sub silentio burial of the distinction
between publicity and signal picketing was approved by the Court in
a subsequent opinion by Justice Powell two years later.9 r In that
case, the Court cited Justice Stevens' concurring opinion when it
said: "We have consistently rejected the claim that secondary picket-
ing by labor unions in violation of § 8(b)(4) is protected activity
under the First Amendment. It would seem even clearer that con-
duct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits still less con-
sideration under the First Amendment."9
UNION SOLICITATION, PICKETING, AND STRIKES
The Burger Court has continued the line of authority developed by
its predecessor designed to promote the rights of employees to solicit
other workers on company property during nonworking time - it
has even invalidated portions of collective bargaining agreements
which have prohibited the right to solicit9 7 and has protected the
distribution of literature on company property which addressed mini-
91. Id. at 614-15.
92. Id. at 616.
93. Id. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Cox, Strikes, Picketing
and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 591-602 (1951); cf. Goldman, The First
Amendment and Non Picketing Labor Publicity Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1469 (1983); Harper, The Consumer's
Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for
American Labor Law, 93 YALE LJ. 409 (1984).
94. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. at 619.
95. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
96. Id. at 226 (quoting Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. at 616) (citations
omitted).
97. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
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mum wage and right to work legislation.9 But employee interest in
nonemployee union organizational access has received less attention
and protection.
In the Logan Valley"9 decision - a case which bears upon both
picketing and solici tation on private property - the Warren Court
held that picketing in a privately owned shopping center was pro-
tected by the first amendment. In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB100
the Burger Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, ad-
dressed the applicability of the Logan Valley principle to nonem-
ployee union organizer solicitation of workers in a retail establish-
ment parking lot. In Central Hardware, the Court refused to expand
statutory principles announced by the Warren Court which create a
presumption against nonemployee union organizational activity, re-
fused to apply constitutional principles to such issues, and hinted at
the demise of Logan Valley, which was soon to come.
Subsequently, the Court announced both the reversal of Logan
Valley and the fact that new statutory principles might apply to
picketing as opposed to solicitation. Said the Court:
The locus of [the] accommodation [between the protection of employees
and private property rights] ... may fall at differing points along the spec-
trum depending on the nature and strength of the respective [employee]
... rights and private property rights asserted in any given context. In
each generic situation, the primary responsibility for making this accommo-
dation must rest with the Board in the first instance.10 1
Meanwhile, however, despite the fact that the Board has treated
this mandate expansively, the Court carefully circumscribed union
rights by holding that an employer could enforce state trespass laws
against picketing on private property regardless of federal law.102 An
important element in the Court's reasoning - this time expressed by
Justice Stevens - was that trespassory organizational activity by
nonemployees was more likely to be unprotected than protected
98. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
99. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
100. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
101. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976).
102. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 447
U.S. 935 (1978). This case involved the doctrine of preemption, as do countless other
confusing and perplexing discussions of the Warren and Burger Courts. See Cox & Seid-
man, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REV. 211 (1950); Cox, Labor Law
Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Gould, The Garmon Case: De-
cline and Threshold of 'Litigating Elucidation, 39 U. DET. L.J. 539 (1962); Meltzer,
The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: II, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1959).
under the statutes. Accordingly, reasoned the Court, any potential
collision between state and federal law and the erosion of the latter
was minimal.
Finally, the Court, in another preemption case in which it found
itself divided again, may have created mischief and an additional
incentive for employers to resist strikes and the reinstatement of
strikers.10 8 It is to be recalled that unfair labor practice strikers have
the right to reinstatement but economic strikers whose conduct is not
prompted by employer illegal conduct may be permanently replaced.
The Burger Court's rules, outlined below, incite litigation about
whether a strike is of the unfair labor practice or economic variety
because jobs are at stake - litigation that may take years to
complete.
In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale1" the majority of the Court held that a
strikebreaking employee who replaces a striker and is promised per-
manent status and is subsequently replaced by the employer pursu-
ant to settlement and litigation before the NLRB may sue in state
court for wrongful discharge.10 5 Given the greater reliance upon
strikebreakers by employers, one cannot assume that this decision
will necessarily make most companies reluctant to hire permanent
replacements for strikers, although the rise in wrongful discharge lit-
igation may make some employers more fearful about hiring strike
replacements. But it may well increase resistance to reinstatement of
strikers in the context of unfair labor practice litigation because of a
concern with the wrongful discharge actions that may follow such
decisions.
CONCERTED ACTIVITY
The concerted activity cases also demonstrate the proposition that
the balance has not swung entirely against labor. By 5-4 vote, the
Court, this time speaking through Justice Brennan, held that an em-
ployee who refused to drive a truck which he believed to be unsafe
could not be discharged where the collective bargaining agreement
provided that employees were not required to operate unsafe vehi-
cles.106 The Court held that even through the employee was not act-
103. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983). State regulation of the strike has
been allowed more recently in Baker v. General Motors Corp., 106 S. Ct. 3129 (1986).
104. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
105. Id. at 512. Preemption issues applicable to state wrongful discharge actions
first presented themselves to the Burger Court in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Lueck, 105
S. Ct. 1904 (1985). See generally Gould, Hay & Rosenfeld, When State and Federal
Laws Collide: Preemption - Nightmare or Opportunity?, 9 INDUs. REL. L.J. 4 (1987);
To Strike A New Balance: A Report of the Ad Hoe Committee on Termination-at-Will
and Wrongful Discharge, at 16-23 (Feb. 8, 1984) (Appointed by the Labor and Employ-
ment Section of the State Bar of California).
106. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984). On concerted activity as a
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ing on his own, the activity was nonetheless concerted and therefore
protected under the NLRA. Said the Court:
The invocation of a right rooted in a collective-bargaining agreement is un-
questionably an integral part of the process that gave rise to the agreement.
That process - beginning with the organization of a union, continuing into
the negotiation of a collective-bargaining agreement, and extending through
the enforcement of the agreement - is a single, collective activity.107
In holding that the action in question constituted "constructive"
concerted activity, the Court relied 08 upon another Burger Court
opinion authored by Justice Brennan - also promoting union and
employee interests - in which the Court held that in a disciplinary
investigatory interview that might lead to the employee's discharge,
the employee had a statutory right to be represented by a union rep-
resentative.109 This holding may have laid the groundwork for the
Courts' reversal of a Reagan Board decision that a single employee
cannot engage in concerted activity when protesting employment
conditions which are of concern to the group.110
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON UNION ACTIVITY
In cases involving both antitrust liability for unions as well as the
circumstances under which injunctions may be imposed for violations
of no strike clausesn11 the Burger Court initially came down on the
side of restrictions and liability. The Court now seems to have lim-
ited the sweep of antitrust liability in a case interpreting the
NLRA, 12 and in two other important decisions upholding collective
bargaining agreements which allowed the longshoremen to recapture
a work loss caused by containerization.11 3 The agreements were up-
held against the contention that they constituted secondary interfer-
ence with warehouse employers whose employees were stuffing and
unstuffing containers.
prerequisite for protected status, see W. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW
95-98 (2d ed. 1986).
107. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 831-32.
108. Id. at 830.
109. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
110. Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
111. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970);
see also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Cantor,
Strikes over Non-Arbitrable Labor Disputes, 23 B.C. L. Rev. 633 (1982). See generally
Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions and the Judges: The Boys Market Case, 1970 Sup.
CT. REV. 215; Gould, supra note 35.
112. Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645 (1982).
113. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490 (1980); NLRB
v. International Longshormen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61 (1985).
Finally, in a 5-4 decision the Court held that injunctive relief for
violations of no strike clauses does not extend to sympathy stop-
pages.114 I have long thought Justice Stevens' dissent as much the
better of the arguments. But the Court has not yet recanted and
indeed has extended the sympathy strike principle to political strikes,
even though the union gave a binding contractual commitment not to
strike in both cases.
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
While the Court held that the union could violate its duty of fair
representation and obligation to employees through the manner in
which it conducted the case before a tribunal,11  the fact is that in a
series of decisions the positions of unions and employer defendants in
duty of fair representation litigation has been eased considerably. In
IBEW v. Foust,"' a 5-4 majority of the Court held that punitive
damages could not be obtained against a union which had violated
its duty of fair representation and obligation. And in the Court's Del
Costello117 decision a relatively abbreviated statute of limitations for
unions fending off duty of fair representation cases - that is, the six
month period applicable to unfair labor practice disputes under the
Act - meant the unions were able to successfully dismiss many
cases that might have kept them in the courts before jurors for years
to come.
Nevertheless, on balance, these decisions must be viewed as part
of the long series of pro-arbitration decisions which have flowed in
the wake of the Warren Court's Steelworkers Trilogy,""8 which have
been designed to promote the integrity of the grievance-arbitration
114. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 457
U.S. 702 (1982).
115. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). The Court thus
extended the principles articulated in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). On the duty of
fair representation, see generally Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the
Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 PA. L. REV. 251
(1977); Tobias, The Plaintiffs View of '301-DFR' Litigation, 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 510
(1980); Vandervelde, A Fair Process Model for the Union's Fair Representation Duty,
67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983); Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the
Courts Do In Fact, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 89 (1985). The Burger Court decided what will
surely be the first in a series of cases dealing with the application of the Steelworkers
Trilogy principles to public policy considerations in arbitration. See W.R. Grace Co. v.
Local 759, Rubberworkers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
116. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
117. Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
118. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See Aaron, Judicial
Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REV. 41 (1967); Cox, Grievance Arbitra-
tion in the Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. REV. 591 (1954); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in
Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999 (1954).
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machinery contained in the collective bargaining agreement and not
so much designed to promote the effective functioning of unions in
the bargaining relationship. The Court's most recent decision, and
perhaps the most important decision in the duty of fair representa-
tion arena, makes this point well.
In Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service,11 9 a 5-4 majority of the Burger
Court imposed a major portion of damage liability upon unions in
duty of fair representation cases. It has done this through calculating
the union's liability from the time at which the grievance should
have gone before an arbitrator. Since the major portion of time the
parties are liable for damages suffered is after the time that arbitra-
tion should have taken place - given the substantial delay involved
in bringing the case before judge and jury - this means that unions
carry the major burden of liability in the bulk of fair representation
cases. Whether the rule is rigidly applied or the unions are able to
negotiate contractual provisions which will permit them to elude lia-
bility remains to be seen. But Bowen most certainly provides a tilt in
favor of management and against labor.
CONCLUSION
There is a certain irony in some of the major Burger Court "union
victories." The most important decisions seem to have taken place at
the expense of the workers that they represent. Teamsters has made
it more difficult for blacks, Mexican-Americans and women to fight
job discrimination. Emporium-Capwell has made resort to self-help
and a balance between union authority and the right of dissidents to
protest when the union is not responsive more difficult. Sadlowski
promotes the entrenchment of incumbent officials under a statute
which is designed to promote democracy.
In all of these areas there is no shift from the Warren Court. In-
deed, the opinions' authors were Warren Court members - Justice
Marshall in Emporium Capwell and Sadlowski, and Justice Stewart
in Teamsters.
The Burger Court cannot be characterized as anti-labor - any
more than the Warren Court could be characterized as pro-labor -
although a greater number of cases were decided by the Burger
Court for employers. The Burger Court's more sweeping decisions in
the job security area - First National Maintenance and Howard
Johnson are the most prominent decisions - find their roots in the
119. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
Warren Court's Darlington120 decision which characterized manage-
ment's right to close a plant as a prerogative which could not be
limited by law even if motivated by anti-union considerations. The
same is true of secondary picketing. Even Yeshiva might be seen as
tied to Insurance Agents and Justice Douglas' 1947 dissent in Pack-
ard Motor Co. v. NLRB 21 which prompted Congress to exclude su-
pervisors from the Act's coverage because of the assumed adversarial
relationship between labor and management.
If anything, however, the Burger Court decisions in the labor law
arena represent a continued swing of the pendulum against the inter-
ests of organized labor. This undoubtedly reflects an increasingly
hostile environment with which organized labor is confronted - the
roots of which extend far beyond law itself - and thus is an exam-
ple of the Court not only reading the election returns, but also read-
ing the mood of the country.
Thus, the Burger Court did not move the pendulum in a different
direction. The pendulum's swing has just been accelerated. The beat
goes on - marcato.
120. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
121. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
